INFOthreat·

CVE-2026-25089: Fortinet FortiSandbox OS Command Injection Vulnerability

Fortinet FortiSandbox products are vulnerable to an unauthenticated OS command injection (CVE-2026-25089). This critical flaw allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via crafted HTTP requests. Active exploitation has been observed, making immediate patching crucial for affected organizations.

This report was researched and drafted by an AI agent and reviewed by a human analyst prior to publication. View the agent workflow →
Indicators of Compromise(10)
↓ Download STIX
IP193.8.187.42
IP85.11.187.8
MD57f74bb6ba185978134c318bc5f91d23c
SHA1268a8420b791df46380ed9ad69905207e15d8a7c
SHA2562758f4d71a2a2dfdefab81737c2d776b2a3dafe5844fdd2157e089a28447ca98
SHA256479ae5fd7274439ddfa27bc03298ebfdfc5ff17f6412acccf74d4dbd90d94218
SHA256874bcb1c3d050a5b5b333a2198f504fcb27927c2abdd43b07440188a380c52d5
SHA25638353f95fff270f4e3a9d7add8c64666020dd668ce66e15969a736ec48cadc59
SHA2564253dd1a4c0867b0be7732f75b2f630cebfb7fed94270e15fb3b12ae40546d01
SHA2569eaa577c8ba71646928c1c34c3145536b0498f65f26060a6ba00744bcef57644

Overview

CVE-2026-25089 is a critical OS command injection vulnerability affecting Fortinet FortiSandbox, FortiSandbox Cloud, and FortiSandbox PaaS. This flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying system by sending specially crafted HTTP requests. Given its high severity (CVSS 9.8) and confirmed active exploitation, organizations utilizing affected FortiSandbox products are at immediate risk of compromise.

Technical Analysis

  • Vulnerability: Improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command (‘OS Command Injection’) (CWE-78).
  • Impact: Unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE).
  • Attack Vector: Network (AV:N). Exploitation occurs via specifically crafted HTTP requests.
  • Authentication: Not required (PR:N).
  • User Interaction: Not required (UI:N).
  • Affected Products and Versions:
    • Fortinet FortiSandbox versions 4.2.0 through 4.2.8
    • Fortinet FortiSandbox versions 4.4.0 through 4.4.8
    • Fortinet FortiSandbox versions 5.0.0 through 5.0.5
    • Fortinet FortiSandbox Cloud versions 5.0.4 through 5.0.5
    • Fortinet FortiSandbox PaaS versions 5.0.4 through 5.0.5
  • CVSS 3.1 Score: 9.8 (CRITICAL) – CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Detection

  • Monitor FortiSandbox web server logs for unusual HTTP request patterns, especially in URI paths or POST body parameters, that may indicate command injection attempts (e.g., &, |, ;, `, $(), &&, || followed by system commands).
  • Look for unexpected process creation originating from the FortiSandbox application’s user or web server process. This could include sh, bash, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, python, perl, wget, curl, nc, ncat, tftp, or other uncommon binaries.
  • Monitor network egress from FortiSandbox appliances for connections to suspicious external IP addresses or domains, indicative of command and control (C2) or data exfiltration.
  • Hunt for new or modified files in web root directories or system binaries that could indicate webshell deployment or persistence mechanisms.

Sigma Detection Rules

⚠️ AI-generated detection rules. These are experimental starting points. Review field names, EventIDs, and logic against your environment’s schema before deploying. Tune to reduce false positives.

FortiSandbox OS Command Injection – Suspicious Process Spawn (Linux)

title: FortiSandbox OS Command Injection - Suspicious Process Spawn (Linux)
id: 0c2d3e4f-5a6b-7c8d-9e0f-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious process creation originating from common web server processes, indicative of successful OS command injection on a Linux-based system like FortiSandbox.
logsource:
  product: linux
  service: auditd
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '/usr/sbin/httpd'
      - '/usr/sbin/nginx'
      - '/usr/sbin/apache2'
      - '/usr/bin/uwsgi'
      - '/usr/bin/gunicorn'
      - '/usr/bin/php-fpm'
      - '/opt/fortinet/fortisandbox/bin/webserver' # Placeholder, actual path might vary
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/bin/sh'
      - '/bin/bash'
      - '/usr/bin/wget'
      - '/usr/bin/curl'
      - '/usr/bin/python'
      - '/usr/bin/perl'
      - '/usr/bin/nc'
      - '/usr/bin/ncat'
      - '/usr/bin/tftp'
      - '/usr/bin/socat'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child
level: high

FortiSandbox Web Log – OS Command Injection Attempt

title: FortiSandbox Web Log - OS Command Injection Attempt
id: 1a2b3c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-e1f2a3b4c5d6
status: experimental
description: Detects common OS command injection patterns in web server access logs, targeting FortiSandbox appliances.
logsource:
  category: webserver
  service: fortisandbox_web_access # Custom service for FortiSandbox web logs
detection:
  selection:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - '&id='
      - '|id='
      - ';id='
      - '`id='
      - '$('
      - '`'
      - '&&'
      - '||'
      - 'uname'
      - 'whoami'
      - 'cat /etc/passwd'
      - 'ls -la'
      - 'wget '
      - 'curl '
      - 'nc -e '
      - 'bash -c '
  condition: selection
level: medium

Mitigations

  1. Patch Immediately: Apply the latest security updates provided by Fortinet for FortiSandbox, FortiSandbox Cloud, and FortiSandbox PaaS. Refer to the vendor advisory FG-IR-26-141 for specific patch versions.
  2. Network Segmentation: Isolate FortiSandbox appliances on a dedicated network segment with strict ingress/egress filtering to limit potential lateral movement in case of compromise.
  3. Restrict Access: Limit administrative access to FortiSandbox interfaces to trusted IP addresses and enforce strong authentication mechanisms.
  4. Monitor Logs: Ensure comprehensive logging is enabled for FortiSandbox appliances and integrate logs with a SIEM for real-time monitoring and alerting.

References

  • https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-141
  • https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25089
  • https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-25089
  • https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/inside-fortibleed-reverse-engineering-the-cyberstrike-harvester-behind-a-global-fortigate-credential-factory/
  • https://kudelskisecurity.com/research/fortinet-fortibleed-global-compromise-active-exploitation-of-fortinet-vulnerabilities

Indicators of Compromise

Type Value Description
SHA256 2758f4d71a2a2dfdefab81737c2d776b2a3dafe5844fdd2157e089a28447ca98 SHA-256 hash of CyberStrike Harvester v1.5 (via https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/inside-fortibleed-reverse-engineering-the-cyberstrike-harvester-behind-a-global-fortigate-credential-factory/)
SHA256 38353f95fff270f4e3a9d7add8c64666020dd668ce66e15969a736ec48cadc59 SHA-256 hash of ad_enum.py (LDAP enumeration tooling) (via https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/inside-fortibleed-reverse-engineering-the-cyberstrike-harvester-behind-a-global-fortigate-credential-factory/)
SHA256 4253dd1a4c0867b0be7732f75b2f630cebfb7fed94270e15fb3b12ae40546d01 SHA-256 hash of backup_dfs.py (SMB/DFS triage collection) (via https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/inside-fortibleed-reverse-engineering-the-cyberstrike-harvester-behind-a-global-fortigate-credential-factory/)
SHA256 479ae5fd7274439ddfa27bc03298ebfdfc5ff17f6412acccf74d4dbd90d94218 SHA-256 hash of bot.py (Telegram Hashcat bot) (via https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/inside-fortibleed-reverse-engineering-the-cyberstrike-harvester-behind-a-global-fortigate-credential-factory/)
SHA256 874bcb1c3d050a5b5b333a2198f504fcb27927c2abdd43b07440188a380c52d5 SHA-256 hash of ad_full_audit.py (LDAP/AD audit tooling) (via https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/inside-fortibleed-reverse-engineering-the-cyberstrike-harvester-behind-a-global-fortigate-credential-factory/)
SHA256 9eaa577c8ba71646928c1c34c3145536b0498f65f26060a6ba00744bcef57644 SHA-256 hash of backup_dfs2.py (SMB/DFS full/incremental collection) (via https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/inside-fortibleed-reverse-engineering-the-cyberstrike-harvester-behind-a-global-fortigate-credential-factory/)
SHA1 268a8420b791df46380ed9ad69905207e15d8a7c GNU Build ID for CyberStrike Harvester (via https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/inside-fortibleed-reverse-engineering-the-cyberstrike-harvester-behind-a-global-fortigate-credential-factory/)
MD5 7f74bb6ba185978134c318bc5f91d23c MD5 hash of CyberStrike Harvester v1.5 (via https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/inside-fortibleed-reverse-engineering-the-cyberstrike-harvester-behind-a-global-fortigate-credential-factory/)
IP Address 193.8.187.42 SSH exfiltration/staging server (via https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/inside-fortibleed-reverse-engineering-the-cyberstrike-harvester-behind-a-global-fortigate-credential-factory/)
IP Address 85.11.187.8 Hashtopolis/API endpoint (via https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/inside-fortibleed-reverse-engineering-the-cyberstrike-harvester-behind-a-global-fortigate-credential-factory/)

MITRE ATT&CK

🤖 AI Attribution
Generated by gemini-2.5-flash ·
2,278 input / 1,824 output tokens ·
Reviewed and approved by a human analyst before publication
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